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Accommodating ‘unaccustomed pragmatic spaces’ in Arbib’s model 
Alison Wray 
 
Introduction 
 
Arbib offers a sophisticated and convincing account of the evolution of human language that 
does not shy away from nailing together neurophysiology and the forms and functions of 
language. The core recognition of what language does, rather than just what language looks 
like or how its forms are generated, gives the model a high level of explanatory significance. 
 
This commentary explores interaction in the context of his account of comprehension, section 
4.3.2, offering some observations that potentially test and support the model. They expand 
Arbib’s existing consideration of agrammatism, where he suggests that difficulties with 
managing the linguistic system (Grammatical Route, G, including Light Semantics, LS) are 
compensated for using world knowledge (Heavy Semantics, HS). That is, if, in 
comprehension, one is not sure how the words go together, one increases attention to the 
pragmatics generated by the observable context and general memory to fill in the gaps. 
 
I introduce the opposite situation, where, in dementia of the Alzheimer’s type, compromises 
to world knowledge and pragmatics create unstable HS, and may generate ambiguity in the 
linguistic input. I consider how Arbib’s model sheds light on the typical fixes for this 
eventuality, and also venture a link back to the protolanguage account. 
 
‘Pragmatic spaces’ in dementia communication 
 
In Arbib’s model, comprehension of linguistic input requires a match between G/LS and 
HS—that is, between the linguistic content and a candidate SemRep adduced from the scene 
and world knowledge. Pragmatics is vital because “A single scene can have many SemReps” 
[p.42] and additional information is required to assign appropriate meaning. But what would 
happen if the disambiguating information were both inherently unstable and incompatible 
with something in the linguistic encoding? 
 
Let us consider a scenario. A person with dementia (PwD) asks a question, and the family 
carer (FC) answers it. Later, PwD, having forgotten that the previous iteration took place, 
asks the question again. Because she does not remember asking it previously, she encodes it 
as being asked for the first time. That is, she does not mark it pragmatically as a repeat. FC, 
however, remembers answering that question only a matter of minutes ago, and encodes his 
response using lexis and/or intonation that marks it as a repeat of old information (e.g. 
emphasised; with irritation). In short, there is a conflict between the two parties’ assumptions 
of shared knowledge. In unimpaired communication contexts, mismatches like this are 
addressed by means of rationales like, I must have misheard/been misheard/missed the 
significance of the speech event, etc. That is, in line with Arbib’s model, world knowledge 
can be updated on the basis of linguistic content as well as the reverse. 
 
In Arbib’s terms, FC’s world knowledge is challenged by the active SemRep data from 
PwD’s encoding, surfacing a contradiction with what he believed was shared information 
about the world. Taking FC’s response as active SemRep, PwD likewise undergoes query to 
her world knowledge, and must infer that something is wrong with her mental map—either 
accurately surmising that she has inadvertently failed to access what should be shared 
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knowledge, or else perhaps only perceiving that FC is unexpectedly annoyed for some 
reason. The point of interest is how this situation is managed by the two parties. 
 
We are dealing here with a different situation from the one whereby “a patient suffering from 
brain lesions impairing her capacity to use grammatical cues can compensate in some cases 
by relying on her knowledge of the world to assign linguistic inputs to their correct semantic 
role” (4.3). In dementia, access to elements of world knowledge becomes unstable. 
Furthermore, this instability impacts not just on PwD but also FC. PwD is unsure what the 
core interactional parameters are (should I know you? Am I supposed to know what’s about to 
happen?). FC is unsure what PwD knows/remembers and how best to frame messages. As a 
result, neither party is in a strong position accurately to rebuild the pragmatic base on which 
shared knowledge is built. In constructing SemRep, HS is no longer a reliable means of 
supplementing shortfalls in G and LS—of which, in the dementia context, where linguistic 
encoding and decoding are compromised, there are sure to be many. 
 
Since it is well-documented that interaction between a PwD and a Family or Professional 
Carer (FPC) can be emotionally charged and stressful, we can take it that the system 
destabilised in this way is not necessarily easy to rebalance. Indeed, I shall show how the 
attempt to fix things can actually exacerbate the problem, by creating out of the instability 
pockets of ‘unaccustomed pragmatic spaces’ that are even harder to manage. 
 
To develop this point, I turn the telescope round, to consider what, in practice, PwDs and 
FPCs do to resolve the problem and where it leaves them. I shall then consider whether 
Arbib’s model easily adapts to accommodate those scenarios.  
 
The creation of ‘unaccustomed pragmatic spaces’ 
 
A PwD is not unaware of the problems for interaction that her condition is creating. The 
inability to manipulate words, grammar and memories in conversation is a frustrating reality, 
and attempts will be made to minimise the damage. This damage is both informational (e.g. 
failure to understand or express a complex idea) and emotional (e.g. frustration at not 
understanding; helplessness about not being understood; distress and hurt in the face of 
responses encoded with exasperation and impatience, as described earlier).  
 
Various responses are possible, including social withdrawal, talking to minimise the need to 
listen, and, as described next, linguistic patches that simultaneously succeed in their 
immediate purpose but also introduce unintended consequences in the form of unaccustomed 
pragmatic spaces. 
 
An unaccustomed pragmatic space is an unexpected gap in the pragmatic fabric, which 
cannot be mended using customary strategies. Unaccustomed pragmatic spaces arise because 
the interlocutors’ confidence in pinning down what is core shared knowledge is undermined. 
They reflect inherent ambiguity that, I shall suggest, is consequent on the deployment of 
pseudo-linguistic forms anchored in HS only, and that, despite their appearance, are not 
suitable to feed into G/LS processing. Let us consider some real examples.  
 
Example 1: ‘Maureen’, a PwD with a strong drive to disguise the severity of her problems, 
developed the strategy of preceding her questions with ‘I’ve probably asked you this already, 
but…’ [1].  
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Comment: Although this is a rational fix, because it defuses the interlocutor’s irritation at the 
repetition of a question, a PwD who deploys it cannot help but attach it equally to questions 
that she has and hasn’t asked before. For the interlocutor, therefore, a new crack appears: 
when PwD fails to use that preface, does it signal that she knows (or believes she knows) it is 
a new question, or that she has forgotten she often repeats questions? The way the 
interlocutor jumps will significantly influence how the interaction continues. 
 
Example 2: ‘Joan’, a retired international opera singer, presented, at a weekend masterclass 
for singers, with noticeable symptoms of Alzheimer’s [4]. Struggling with word finding, she 
adopted a set of formulaic expressions for use in commenting on the performances. One was 
‘that’s lovely darling’. However, she used this expression not only in neutral and positive 
responses, but also immediately before a contradictory comment about, for example, poor 
tuning. 
Comment: Singing teachers often have formulas for beginning their feedback in a manner 
that minimises loss of positive face. However, by using the phrase indiscriminately, Joan 
detached it from any reliable meaning, and risked confusing the singer (was it lovely or 
wasn’t it?) 
 
Example 3: ‘Clive’, no longer able reliably to remember who people are, adopted a single, 
neutral expression when people entered the room: ‘Hallo Mate, what can I do for you?’ 
(Clive’s son, personal communication). 
Comment: This is a credible proactive fix, because it creates a space for the interlocutor to 
provide cues about his identity and his business without either party getting embarrassed. But 
used universally, it overlays any remaining capacity to take the local situation into account. 
Thus, Clive might use it when his son re-enters the room after five minutes absence, even 
though he has not entirely forgotten the immediate past. His son, then, cannot tell if Clive 
really can’t remember, or is just ‘saying his thing’. 
 
Example 4: A PwD is aware that she doesn’t always understand what is said to her. She 
adopts ‘yes I know’ to help her complete her turn and pass the floor back to the interlocutor.  
Comment: Although she successfully maintains the conversational flow, the ubiquity of the 
expression means that the interlocutor cannot tell what has and has not been understood, 
making it difficult to proceed. 
 
These examples are indicative of a much larger phenomenon, whereby PwDs deploy easily-
produced formulaic expressions as a tool to manage the crisis in pragmatics. However the 
deployment of formulaic expressions is not confined to PwDs: they are also used in striking 
number by the interlocutors (e.g. oh, that’s nice; there we are; oh dear; eat up now) [5]. 
Here, they seem to be a mechanism for psychological distancing [6,8]. It seems that if one 
puts less cognitive effort into producing output, it creates a protective emotional space: I’m 
not investing much in you, so your behaviour doesn’t get to me. 
 
To sum up, one solution used by both PwDs and FPCs is to employ formulaic expressions as 
a kind of patch over actual or potential gaps in the flow of communication. This being so, it is 
important to identify the linguistic status of the sorts of formulaic expressions that are 
typically used. Formulaic language comes in many forms and has many functions [3], most of 
which need not concern us here. There is a subset that are function-heavy and meaning-light 
(e.g. how do you do; have a nice day; as the actress said to the bishop; ah well). It is not that 
they are meaningless in linguistic terms, but that content semantics takes a back seat, even to 
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the extent that if function and content conflict, function overrides (e.g. fine thank you). It is 
this type that PwDs and FPCs seem to exploit to manage interactional challenges.  
 
Where do they fit in Arbib’s model? His adoption of construction grammar is helpful here. 
We do not need to suppose that the expressions are generated from their parts every time they 
are produced. More salient, indeed, is to ask whether we should count them as regular 
examples of (single item) lexis (W). I want to propose that, certainly, like many multiword 
strings, they do have the status of a single item (be it ‘word’ or ‘construction’)—but that the 
type described here is a special case.  
 
Arbib proposes that instances of W that are content words activate both LS and HS, so that 
world knowledge is both drawn on to interpret them and, reciprocally, can be modified by 
them. We could without difficulty extend W to include multiword strings with a coherent 
semantic unity, such as Christmas tree and gang up on. Where W is a function word, Arbib 
suggests, only LS is involved. Again, we can easily expand W to include multiword function 
lexis such as in order to and out of. He offers, however, no subtype of W that activates only 
HS. 
 
Could it be that single and multiword formulaic expressions with a pragmatic management 
role counterbalance the function words, by involving only HS, and being ignored by LS? This 
would certainly be consistent with their being cognitive ‘lite’. They would be, in a sense, 
verbalised versions of visual gestures—both words and not words, much as has long been 
proposed for ‘non-propositional’ language [2]. Arbib’s suggestion that the HS route is blind 
to grammatical cues indirectly supports this view, because of the capacity for formulaic 
expressions to sustain non-canonical patterns without challenge over time [3]. It would also 
explain why the ‘word’ is a fuzzy concept [9] and why we observe fundamental hybridity in 
grammar [7]—for such formulaic expressions resemble regular G/LS material, but their 
forms and functions can break the mould. 
 
Most importantly, it would help explain the generation of unaccustomed pragmatic spaces in 
dementia interaction. They arise not because there is anything wrong with the use of these 
HS-only W items, but because it is difficult for a hearer to treat them as HS only when 
searching for meaning in an unstable interaction. As a result, the hearer is caught between 
two often contradictory interpretations, HS-only, and G/LS: when you say what are we doing 
today? have you really forgotten or is it just what you say to open a conversation? When you 
suddenly don’t say it, is it because you can remember, or for some other reason? The 
ambiguity creates conditions of stress that will often encourage FPCs to use their own HS-
only expressions, as a means of reducing cognitive engagement. 
 
Full circle? 
 
In section 3.1 Arbib aligns himself with my holistic protolanguage model, whereby forms 
managed by pragmatics preceded referential lexis and grammar. As such, we have in place 
from the pre-G/LS era a link between HS and complete messages, and we do not need to 
concern ourselves with how the formulaic responses that can now result in unaccustomed 
pragmatics spaces might have come about. They are, perhaps, a remnant of what was, before 
we had the full flexibility of LS and G, a primary solution to the daily challenge of shoring up 
the walls of (unpredictable) shared knowledge. The emergence of full language would have 
provided the mechanism for a more nuanced management of shared knowledge in normal 
circumstances, with the vast majority of single and multiword W tied to LS. When, in 
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extremis, we deploy W in an HS-only mode, perhaps we glimpse the power and limitations of 
G and LS in unpicking holistic meaning-making. 
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